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Second Amendment doctrine going forward. Like the Fourth Amendment,
the Second Amendment suggests an initial equilibrium—or actually,
multiple equilibria—between government power to possess, use, and control
the implements of violence and private power to do the same. And, like
Fourth Amendment doctrine, Second Amendment doctrine must contend
with both technological and societal change. These changes—e.g., more
deadly and accurate weapons, more public acceptance of concealed carry—
can upset whatever initial balance of gun rights and regulation there may
have been in the initial state. Although this Essay recognizes factors that
make Second Amendment equilibrium-adjustment distinctive and
challenging, the theory may nonetheless allow courts and scholars to get
some purchase on the problem of change in Second Amendment adjudication
and provide a vocabulary to explain the objectives of the emerging doctrine
for the right to keep and bear arms.
AUTHOR—Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law, Duke University School of
Law. Thanks to Elliot Louthen, Adam Sopko, the editors of the Northwestern
University Law Review, Joseph Blocher, Jake Charles, Orin Kerr, the
participants at the Center for Law, Society and Culture Colloquia at Indiana
University, Maurer School of Law, the participants at the University of
Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law Workshop, and the participants at
the Constitutional Law Workshop, Loyola Law School, Chicago.

239

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 240
I.

SECOND AMENDMENT EQUILIBRIA ....................................................................... 246
A. Setting the Year-Zero Equilibria ................................................................. 246
B. Stating the Year-Zero Equilibria ................................................................ 249
C. Equilibrium-Adjustment .............................................................................. 256

II.

RESETTING THE YEAR-ZERO EQUILIBRIA ............................................................. 261
A. The Standing Army ..................................................................................... 264
B. Professional Law Enforcement ................................................................... 266

III. EQUILIBRIUM-ADJUSTMENT AND SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE ...................... 268
A. The Exclusive Text, History, Tradition, and Analogy Approach ................. 269
B. The Two-Step Framework........................................................................... 271
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 272

INTRODUCTION
Constitutional doctrines inevitably confront social and technological
change.1 A due process doctrine crafted to govern real property must answer
questions about cryptocurrency.2 A free expression jurisprudence developed
to protect leafleteers must apply to sellers of violent video games. 3 The
Second Amendment is no different. Its text was ratified when trained
marksmen fired four shots per minute.4 Today, the doctrine must address
technology one hundred times as lethal.5
What is different about the Second Amendment challenge of change is
that judges have at their disposal a century’s worth of theoretical tools to

1 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 GEO. L.J. 97, 99–100 (2014)
(“Identifying legal change is an ordinary part of legal decision-making . . . .”); Lee J. Strang, Originalism
and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which
Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 927–29
(2009) (“The challenge of change is especially pronounced in our society because we have both a written
Constitution and a society that has undergone tremendous change in the period during which the
Constitution has been in force.”).
2 See CFTC v. Reynolds, No. 1:19-cv-05631-MKV, 2021 WL 796683, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021)
(applying the minimal-contact due process test for jurisdiction to the alleged theft of cryptocurrency via
a Ponzi scheme).
3 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 788 (2011) (“We consider whether a California law
imposing restrictions on violent video games comports with the First Amendment.”).
4 Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus
Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 47 n.249 (2012) (citing James E. Hicks, United
States Military Shoulder Arms, 1795-1935, 1 J. AM. MIL. HIST. FOUND. 23, 30 (1937)).
5 The “Bump Stocks” Used in the Las Vegas Shooting May Soon Be Banned, ECONOMIST (Oct. 6,
2017), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/10/06/the-bump-stocks-used-in-the-las-vegasshooting-may-soon-be-banned [https://perma.cc/G32P-7ZYU] (noting that “bump stocks” can allow
semiautomatic firearms to fire 400 to 800 rounds per minute).

240

116:239 (2021)

Second Amendment Equilibria

shape the doctrine at precisely the moment there is deep disagreement as to
the legitimacy of those tools. The conventional two-step framework applied
by the appellate courts—a categorical approach largely based in text, history,
and tradition at step one and a standard tailoring approach at step two6—is
viewed with skepticism by gun-rights advocates 7 and some judges and
Justices.8 The only legitimate approach to Second Amendment doctrine, they
argue, is to use text, history, and tradition, and analogies therefrom.9
In practice, the text, history, tradition, and analogy approach (whether
exclusive or the first step of the two-step framework) relies more on history,
tradition, and analogy than text. No judge uses the text alone to answer
difficult Second Amendment questions. Examining the original public
meaning of the Second Amendment term by term (hardly a universally
accepted form of textualism10) would mean “keep” simply means “have,”
“bear” simply means “carry,” and “Arms” simply means “weapons.”11 I am
aware of no judicial officer who has endorsed a constitutional right to own
and carry a hand grenade (or similarly lethal device), no matter how literally
one reads “to keep and bear Arms” to mean “to have and carry weapons.”12
Not that a phrase-oriented approach13 to the text works any better—if
original public meaning is the only legitimate method of constitutional
See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Our court, along with the majority
of our sister circuits, has adopted a two-step inquiry in deciding Second Amendment cases . . . . [T]he
court in the first step asks if the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment,
based on a ‘historical understanding of the scope of the right’ . . . . [T]he second step of the inquiry . . .
determine[s] the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 625 (2008))).
7 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 4, N.Y.
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280) (“This Court should
reaffirm that Second Amendment challenges are governed by Heller’s text-and-history standard, not the
‘tiers of scrutiny’ that are applied in the First Amendment and Equal Protection contexts.”).
8 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he proper interpretive approach is to reason by analogy from history and tradition.”).
9 See id. at 1285.
10 Compare Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–43 (2020) (analyzing terms
“discriminate,” “because of,” and “sex” and holding that the terms combined cover discrimination due to
sexual orientation and transgender status), with id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts must
follow ordinary meaning, not literal meaning. And courts must adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases,
not just the meaning of the words in a phrase.”).
11 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581–84.
12 See Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that hand grenades and machine
guns are unprotected “dangerous and unusual weapons for the purposes of the Second Amendment”);
Bezet v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 3d 576, 603 (E.D. La. 2017) (reiterating that hand grenades are
dangerous and “likely unprotected under the Second Amendment” even if available to criminals); see
also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 414 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (Manion, J., dissenting)
(stating that hand grenades are categorically excluded from Second Amendment coverage).
13 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that ordinary meaning is the
meaning of phrases, not just individual words).
6
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interpretation. 14 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court decided that
speakers of English in 1791 used the term “bear arms” to mean “carry
weapons” for confrontation.15 New linguistic research of eighteenth-century
sources, using big-data techniques unavailable to the Court when it decided
Heller, proves convincingly that the Founding generation did not ordinarily
use the phrase “bear arms” to mean “carry weapons.” 16 Even scholars
sympathetic to expansive gun rights acknowledge that the text’s original
public meaning is not on their side.17
Equally unavailing is a purposivist approach built around the object of
“self-defense.” As my coauthor and I have mentioned elsewhere, selfdefense covers persons—like prisoners and minor children—who plainly
have no rights to possess firearms.18 Self-defense cannot distinguish between
14 For arguments that original public meaning is the only legitimate method of constitutional
interpretation, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 654 (1999)
(“Putting a constitution in writing is conducive to preserving the rights of the people from infringement
by government officials, but only if its original meaning is not contradicted or altered without adhering
to formal amendment procedures.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force
of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1131 (2003) (arguing that the “proper”
method is “application of the words and phrases of the text in accordance with the meaning they would
have had at the time they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted
the text as law”); and see also Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[B]ecause the Constitution is supreme over other sources of law, it requires us to privilege
its text over our own precedents when the two are in conflict.”).
15 554 U.S. at 582–86.
16 Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
509, 510–11 (2019) (finding that of 900 uses of “bear arms” in eighteenth-century records, only seven
were nonmilitary or ambiguous); Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second
Amendment, PANORAMA (Aug. 3, 2018), http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-semanticsand-the-meaning-of-the-second-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/43CW-ZL6T] (reviewing 181 documents
from 1765 to 1795 with the phrase “bear arms” and concluding that the term “referred to an activity
undertaken by groups of people, not only by individuals”); Brief of Neal Goldfarb as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Arguing that as to the Second Amendment Issue, the Petition Should be
Dismissed as Improvidently Granted at 2, 21, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York,
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280) (reviewing over 500 contemporaneous uses of “bear arms” and
finding that “as to almost every important conclusion about the meaning of [the operative clause], Heller
was mistaken”). For challenges to this methodology and its resulting conclusions, see Shlomo Klapper,
(Mis)judging Ordinary Meaning?: Corpus Linguistics, the Frequency Fallacy, and the ExtensionAbstraction Distinction in “Ordinary Meaning” Textualism, 8 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 327, 352 (2019)
(“In sum, it is entirely possible that in its most empirically frequent use, ‘bear arms’ was not synonymous
to ‘carry arms.’ But that does not matter for linguistic or legal interpretation. Rather, the question is: is
‘bear arms’ a sufficiently ordinary way to describe individual gun possession?”).
17 Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment, HARV. L.
REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-secondamendment/ [https://perma.cc/ZNH2-42VC] (“[T]he overwhelming majority of instances of ‘bear arms’
was in the military context.”).
18 See, e.g., JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 152–54 (2018) (“[F]elons and the mentally ill can
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the claims of individuals, groups, states, or nations. For example, is it
acceptable to carry a firearm solely to prepare for confrontation with police?
Plus, self-defense at common law is more limited than the right to keep and
bear arms.19 Self-defense requires an imminent threat, and that threat may
only be countered by necessary and proportional force. Yet, one can possess
firearms in the home for self-defense, no matter how remote the threat, how
unnecessary the firearm, or how disproportionate lethal force is to the threat
that materializes.20
It would seem that textualism—at least of the “original public meaning”
variety—will not suffice to steer the doctrine in the next decade; nor will
purposivism—if “purpose” is understood simply to mean self-defense.
Equilibrium-adjustment theory may help resolve the impasse and set the
doctrine on the right course.
A decade ago, Professor Orin Kerr wrote a brilliant article: An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment.21 His theory was
that judges apply Fourth Amendment doctrine to maintain an equilibrium
between government power and personal liberty. As he writes:
When changing technology or social practice makes evidence substantially
harder for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court generally adopts lower
Fourth Amendment protections for these new circumstances to help restore the
status quo ante level of government power. On the other hand, when changing
technology or social practice makes evidence substantially easier for the
government to obtain, the Supreme Court often embraces higher protections to
help restore the prior level of privacy protection.22

Professor Kerr’s model begins with a thought experiment: a “Year
Zero” without technology (no fences, no cars, no cell phones, and no
wiretaps).23 In Year Zero, the power of the state and the protection of privacy
are in equilibrium, maintained by certain rules: warrants for the searches of
homes and probable cause for arrest of persons. 24 As new technology
becomes available or new social customs develop, the courts in a case-bycase fashion try to restore the balance set at Year Zero. So, for example, as
claim moral and legal rights to self-defense, and yet Heller specifically carves them out from Second
Amendment coverage.”).
19 Id. at 153.
20 Id.
21 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
476 (2011).
22 Id. at 480.
23 See id. at 482–83 (discussing “a world with no tools to help commit or investigate crimes”).
24 See id. at 484. This equilibrium does not have to be ideal in any welfarist or deontological sense—
it could empower the police too much; it could protect privacy too much—but it is an equilibrium. Id. at
485.
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criminals obtain cars to transport contraband, courts interpret Fourth
Amendment rules to grant law enforcement greater flexibility to search
automobiles and hence restore the distribution of police power and privacy
that existed in Year Zero.25
Equilibrium-adjustment theory holds promise for rationalizing Second
Amendment jurisprudence. Like the Fourth Amendment, the Second
Amendment appears to suggest a Year-Zero equilibrium (or actually,
multiple equilibria) between government power to possess, use, and control
the implements of violence and private power to do the same. And, like the
Fourth Amendment, Second Amendment doctrine must contend with both
technological change (more deadly and concealable arms, micro-stamping,26
and 3D printing27) and social change (more social acceptance of concealed
carry 28 and more sensitive places 29 ). These technological and societal
changes can upset whatever the Year-Zero balance of gun rights and
regulation may have been.
Of course, Second Amendment equilibrium-adjustment differs from the
Fourth Amendment in crucial respects. Fourth Amendment equilibriumadjustment focuses on just one dynamic: police power and individual
privacy.30 But with the Second Amendment, there are potentially numerous
equilibria: individuals versus individuals, individuals versus law
enforcement, and individuals versus the military.31
Also, Professor Kerr’s equilibrium-adjustment theory does not consider
societal or technological change that can fundamentally reset the Year-Zero
distribution of power.32 An initial equilibrium between civilian and military
25

Id. at 507–08.
See generally Microstamping & Ballistics in California, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://giffords.org/lawcenter/state-laws/microstamping-ballistics-in-california/
[https://perma.cc/
7MKP-R9GK] (explaining microstamping technology).
27 See generally Jake Hanrahan, 3D-Printed Guns Are Back, and This Time They Are Unstoppable,
WIRED (May 20, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/3d-printed-guns-blueprints [https://perma.cc/
DL2N-B3SK] (describing the rise of a decentralized network of 3-D-printed gunsmiths).
28 See Harel Shapira, Katherine Jensen & Ken-Hou Lin, Trends and Patterns of Concealed Handgun
License Applications: A Multistate Analysis, 5 SOC. CURRENTS 3, 11 (2018) (discussing an increase in
applications for concealed-carry licenses).
29 See United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that the United States
Capitol building parking lot was a “sensitive place”).
30 See Kerr, supra note 21, at 480.
31 See infra Section I.B. For a similar insight, see DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF
THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 287 (2003)
(“In modern America, we . . . live under a condition of checks and balances for the distribution of arms.”).
32 See infra Part II (discussing technological change and its effect on Year-Zero distribution of
power); see also, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 409 (1998) (discussing
“constitutional moment[s]”); Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 59–60 (2017)
26
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access to weapons may rest on the premise that there is no, and will be no,
standing army.33 Once it is stipulated that a standing army is a permanent
feature of the American constitutional order, the balance is fundamentally
altered, and a new balance must be maintained.
Additionally, the federal case law from which to build a Second
Amendment equilibrium-adjustment model is meager compared to the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has decided only four Second
Amendment cases since 2008,34 including the landmark Heller opinion.35 By
comparison, the Court has handed down nearly two hundred Fourth
Amendment cases. 36 Finally, Professor Kerr focuses mostly on Fourth
Amendment Supreme Court case law, 37 rather than on subconstitutional,
statutory, or regulatory adjustments, which appear just as relevant when
considering Second Amendment equilibrium-adjustment theory, especially
given the thin Supreme Court precedent. That said, equilibrium-adjustment
theory does offer some purchase on the problem of change in Second
Amendment adjudication and provides a vocabulary to explain the objectives
of the emerging doctrine.
Part I of this Essay explains the equilibrium-adjustment model,
modified to address the specific issue of gun rights and regulation. It
specifies different possible Year-Zero equilibria for the right to keep and
bear arms: individual versus individual, individual versus law enforcement,
and individual versus military. It then discusses how the law may try to
restore the ex ante distribution of power and authority at Year Zero. Part II
considers how historical events could fundamentally reset the equilibria. Part
III applies this approach to the two contenders for Second Amendment
analysis going forward: the “text, history, tradition, and analogy-only”
approach and the “two-step” framework.

(discussing the effect of “gloss” on clarifying “the Constitution’s distribution of authority” among and
within the federal government branches); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV.
1, 3–4 (2019) (discussing James Madison’s concept of “liquidation” of terms through a period of public
government practice).
33 For example, North Carolina’s 1776 Declaration of Rights stated in relevant part: “[A]s standing
armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up . . . .” N.C. CONST. of 1776,
art. XVII.
34 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (per curiam);
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016) (per curiam); McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
35 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
36 Brent E. Newton, The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Scorecard, 13 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 1,
4 (2017) (identifying 173 Fourth Amendment decisions between 1982 and 2015).
37 Kerr, supra note 21, at 494–95.
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I. SECOND AMENDMENT EQUILIBRIA
Where should we start for our Year Zero for the Second Amendment?
In the beginning, there were no tools for self-defense and no rules for selfdefense. Weapons were fists and teeth, deceit and treachery. The rule was
get what you can, when you can, how you can. Everyone judged his own
case and executed his judgment on everyone else.38 The strong preyed on the
weak, and the cunning preyed on the scrupled. If it sounds familiar, it
should—it’s the Hobbesian state of nature,39 the unregulated marketplace of
violence.40 One can imagine fleeting symmetries in this primeval state, but
they are extremely fragile and always disintegrate.41 Any theory of a Second
Amendment right that begins with the state of nature isn’t really a theory of
law. It’s like creating a standard model of time and space before the Big
Bang.42
A. Setting the Year-Zero Equilibria
Instead, we must calibrate our Year-Zero equilibria to a time when there
were rules for violence and some technology to inflict it. The rules in this
initial state are rooted in history and are, to some extent, transcultural and
transtemporal. Accurately describing the Year-Zero equilibria is essential to
this exercise. One can dispute any given distribution of power and authority
as normatively wrong. The initial equilibria could empower government or
individuals too much. They could be morally suspect either as a matter of
right or as a matter of utility. In that sense, this objection is no different than
that anticipated by Professor Kerr in his Fourth Amendment article, and my
answer to those skeptics is the same—nothing about the initial distribution
of power and authority for the Second Amendment says anything about
whether it is normatively desirable. The point is not that the equilibria are
ideal; the point is that they exist.43
38 See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
JOHN LOCKE 17, 22 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 2005) (“[I]t is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own
cases, [because] self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends[,] and . . . passion[] and
revenge will carry them too far in punishing others . . . .”).
39 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (Clarendon Press 1909) (1651) (describing life in the state of
nature as “nasty, brutish, and short”).
40 See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 18, at 155.
41 See Richard A. Epstein, The Theory and Practice of Self-Help, 1 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 1, 5–6
(2005) (“In the state of nature, cooperation over time becomes a nonstarter because of the overpowering
risk of defection.”).
42 Stephen Hawking, Remarks at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, http://www.pas.va/content/
accademia/en/publications/acta/acta24/hawking.html [https://perma.cc/AZ8X-HQ5Q] (“Asking what
came before the Big Bang[] is meaningless . . . because there is no notion of time available to refer to. It
would be like asking what lies South of the South Pole.”).
43 See Kerr, supra note 21, at 485.
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Of course, the stated initial equilibria could be descriptively wrong.
This objection, unlike the normative one, is subject to falsification. To create
a description of the rules and customs at Year Zero with certainty would be
a herculean undertaking. It would require the compilation and coding of a
vast dataset of historical legal and social practices—not just a few remarks
in Blackstone’s Commentaries,44 a stray comment by an antebellum state
judge, 45 or a random musing by Thomas Jefferson. 46 Instead, it would
demand the cataloging of arms and related data, from a wide range of
sources, including folkways, state and local customs, law enforcement
records, newspaper reports, private correspondence, and policy statements,
as well as statutes, regulations, and state and federal court decisions.
The existing method of simply looking to published cases and statutes
for the legal rules surrounding firearms and self-defense suffers from critical
selection biases. There may be legal rules that went unchallenged because
no one thought they were unlawful. There may be practices that went
unregulated because everyone thought they were protected, or because
everyone considered them so aberrational that they didn’t need to be
specifically prohibited. After compiling such a database of historical laws
and practice, the task would be to determine a stable set of rules and
understandings over some span of time and explain how they form the
baseline equilibria between rights and regulation for Year Zero.47
Amassing historic regulations and practices into a comprehensive,
searchable database is no easy feat. Other scholars have developed methods
to achieve this goal with other kinds of sources. Bodies of digitally
searchable written content and associated research techniques—like corpus
linguistics—enable scholars to examine vast amounts of words and phrases

44

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 91–92 (Ky. 1822) (“[T]o be in conflict with the constitution,
it is not essential that the act should contain a prohibition against bearing arms in every possible
form . . . .”). But see Wyo. Comp. Laws ch. 52 § 1 (1876) (codified at Wyo. Stat. § 980 (1887))
(“Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any resident of any city, town or village, or for any one not a resident
of any city, town or village, in said territory, but a sojourner therein, to bear upon his person, concealed
or openly, any fire-arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village.”).
46 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 19, 1785), in 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 395, 398 (H.A. Washington ed., 1853) (“Let your gun, therefore, be
the constant companion of your walks.”).
47 For example, as both Professor Kerr and I note, the home appears to anchor a number of legal
claims about rights versus regulation through time. Kerr, supra note 21, at 518 (“The home is the one
space protected by the Fourth Amendment that seems impervious to changing technology, changing
social practice, and changing law.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound
Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1305 (2009) (noting the “privilege of the home works a
kind of alchemy with the Constitution”).
45
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within certain time parameters to see how they are used. 48 To the extent
original-public-meaning originalism rests on a falsifiable proposition about
linguistic practice in the Founding Era, these techniques allow lawyers and
linguists to draw conclusions about how phrases were typically used, rather
than idiosyncratically used.49
Similarly, the Year-Zero Second Amendment equilibria could be
understood as those typical social and legal practices drawn from a vast
database of information about the contemporaneous social and legal
environment. Stating the Second Amendment Year-Zero rules with
confidence would then be akin to a data-intensive application of Professor
William Baude’s and Professor Stephen Sachs’s positive- or original-law
originalism,50 where the task is to identify the “original law” that existed at
the relevant time period. Or, alternatively, it may look like a data-driven form
of Professor Lee Strang’s abduced-principles originalism,51 in which lawyers
“ascertain the archetypal practices that the [constitutional text] was
understood to permit, prohibit, or require” and then distill a legal principle
from them.52 Or, yet a third option, it may demand some big-data version of
Professor Saul Cornell’s intellectual-history approach, which requires the

48 Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 833
(2018) (“To the extent our understanding of ordinary meaning should be informed by the linguistic norms
and conventions prevailing at the time that a given legal text was drafted, corpus linguistics can provide
powerful evidence of historic language use.”).
49 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Owning Heller, 30 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 164 (2020)
(highlighting that outlier usages of “bear arms” are not indicative of the ordinary meaning of the
constitutional text); Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV.
261, 269 (2019) (suggesting that the search in “original public meaning” originalism is for the average
speaker of English).
50 Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817,
821 (2015); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2015). To his
credit, Judge Jay S. Bybee in the Ninth Circuit recently attempted to do something like this with a
thorough investigation of seven centuries of regulations and commentary and concluded “[o]ur review of
more than 700 years of English and American legal history reveals a strong theme: government has the
power to regulate arms in the public square.” Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 813 (9th Cir. 2021) (en
banc).
51 Strang, supra note 1; see also Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and
the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 926 (1996) (articulating legal
reasoning as “abductive” reasoning); Young, 992 F.3d at 813 (“[T]he overwhelming evidence from the
states’ constitutions and statutes, the cases, and the commentaries confirms that we have never assumed
that individuals have an unfettered right to carry weapons in public spaces.”).
52 See Strang, supra note 1, at 957, 964 (“Using abduced-principle originalism based on archetypal
practices as an example: first, a judge must identify the data, the archetypal practices regarding which
there was a consensus. Second, the judge must put forward possible norms that explain the data. Third,
the judge will test the possible norms utilizing fit and, if necessary, the Framers’ and Ratifiers’
perspectives, to ascertain which norm is the best explanation of the archetypal practices. Fourth, the judge
will apply that norm in the case before him, the case that had required him to articulate the constitutional
text's original meaning through the process of abduction.”).
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contextualization of constitutional provisions in a web of practice from both
high and low culture.53
B. Stating the Year-Zero Equilibria
Because such a comprehensive undertaking is not possible in these few
pages, an informed hypothesis will have to do. The following description of
Second Amendment equilibria at Year Zero is my best, good faith effort to
synthesize a broad, varied, transnational, and transtemporal set of rules into
an initial distribution of power and authority. Those with more time and
resources could analyze and code various data points about the initial
distribution differently, and I welcome such an effort. With these caveats—
and accepting the contingent nature of this description—the players and rules
of the Year-Zero equilibria follow.
1.

The Players

a. Individuals
Individuals have a right to keep arms “suitable to their condition and
degree” as allowed by law.54 Individuals can openly carry arms only upon
reasonable fear of imminent confrontation, 55 or when and where it is
customary for them to do so—but only with sufficient guarantees that they

53 See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 729 (2013) (“[T]he public and
intersubjective nature of language enjoins historians to recognize that the meaning of a text is determined
by a range of contextual factors, some linguistic and others social.”).
54 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *139.
55 See State v. Burkett, 234 P. 681, 682 (N.M. 1925) (“[I]t is error to refuse to instruct that one having
reasonable grounds to anticipate an unlawful attack endangering life or limb has a right to arm himself
for the purpose of resisting such attack.”); Medley v. State, 448 A.2d 363, 368 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(“[W]hat authority there is on the subject seems to establish the . . . principle––that, at common law, it
was unlawful for a person to go about armed, even as a protective measure in anticipation of attack.”);
6 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 2496 (Philadelphia,
Kay & Bro. 7th & rev. ed. 1874) (“A man cannot excuse wearing such armor in public, by alleging that
such a one threatened him, and that he wears it for the safety of his person against his assault . . . .”);
1 GILBERT HUTCHESON, TREATISE ON THE OFFICES OF JUSTICE OF PEACE; CONSTABLE; COMMISSIONER
OF SUPPLY; AND COMMISSIONER UNDER COMPREHENDING ACTS, IN SCOTLAND 381 (Edinburgh,
William Creech 2d ed. 1809) (same); see also Medley, 448 A.2d at 369 (“[M]ost courts faced with the
issue have expressly refused to recognize apprehension of impending danger as a permissible basis for
one to carry a weapon in contravention of a general statutory prohibition.”); 3 EDWARD COKE, THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161–62 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (describing the case
of Sir Thomas Figett, charged with the crime of carrying weapons when he went “armed under his
garments,” and in front of the king’s ministers, to “safeguard [] his life” even though he’d been threatened
by Sir John Trevet that week).
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present no threat to the public peace.56 Individuals may use force only when
necessary and only as much as is proportional to the threat.57 Because the law
values life above all else, individuals must retreat from confrontation if at all
possible, except within the home. 58 Individuals must internalize all costs
associated with violation of the previous rules and costs unreasonably
inflicted upon third parties.59 Deadly force used in a public setting must have
express or implicit public benefit and sanction.60
b. Domestic law enforcement
Individuals are under a duty to carry arms when performing a law
enforcement function61 and, when performing this function, are not permitted
56

1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136 (London, Nutt & Gosling
1739) (“Persons of Quality are in no Danger of offending against th[e] Statute [of Northampton] by
wearing common Weapons, or having their usual Number of Attendants with them, for their Ornament
or Defence, in such Places, and upon such Occasions, in which it is common Fashion to make use of
them, without causing the least Suspicion of an Intention to commit any Act of Violence or Disturbance
of the Peace.”).
57 Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 63,
82 (2020) (“Self-defense is only lawful when necessary and proportional. Those requirements have the
effect of shepherding conflicts away from violence, and especially lethal violence.”).
58 Id. at 86 (“A traditional exception to the retreat requirement is when lethal self-defense occurs in
the home.”).
59 See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 185 (1655) (stating “[a]ll such as shall go or ride
armed (offensively) in Fairs, Markets, or elsewhere; or shall wear or carry any guns, dags, or pistols
charged; . . . any Constable seeing this, may arrest them, and may carry them before the Justice of peace,
and the Justice may binde them to the peace” and noting armed individuals “striketh a fear and terrour
into the Kings subjects”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(3) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“When the actor is justified
under Sections 3.03 to 3.08 in using force upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or
negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification afforded by those
Sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons.”);
cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 591, 605
(2016) (arguing that Fourth Amendment law is calibrated to make law enforcement agents internalize the
costs of investigation they would otherwise externalize).
60 See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567–68 (1903)
(discussing that historically “homicide could be justified only when done in execution of the king’s writ,
or by authority of a custom by which a thief hand-having and back-bearing, an outlaw, or perhaps other
manifest felons, might be taken by force without a warrant; in short, in cases where the homicide was
committed in execution of the law”); see also 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 479 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
1898) (justifiable homicides at common law “would have been regarded less as cases of . . . self-defence
than as executions”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 90–91 (2017) (discussing historical manner in which homicide had to serve a
public purpose to be justified); Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle
Doctrine Statutes, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (“The only justifiable homicide . . . was one
committed under the auspices of the state, or at least in clear furtherance of the state’s interests.”).
61 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 116 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797)
(1644) (“[T]he duty of the constable is, to raise the power of the towne, as well in the night as in the day,
for the prosecution of the offender . . . .”); WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 137 (St.
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to retreat from confrontation. 62 When they perform a law enforcement
function, they must arm themselves in such a fashion, or in such numbers, as
to exercise superior capacity for force than those they confront.63 Individuals
exercising a legitimate law enforcement function can use any force,
including deadly force, necessary to protect life, limb, and property, or to
effect an arrest. 64 Individuals who are not performing a legitimate law
enforcement function are culpable as ordinary miscreants and can be resisted
as such.65
c. Military
Individuals are under a duty to arm themselves in anticipation of
confrontation with enemies foreign and domestic and to protect the life,

Paul, West Publ’g Co. 1894) (“It is not only every person’s right, but it is his legal duty, to prevent a
felony, even if he has to go to the extreme of taking the life of the person attempting to commit it.”);
HUTCHESON, supra note 55, at 381 (stating it is not a crime for a person to “arm[] himself to suppress
dangerous rioters, rebels, or enemies, and endeavour[] to suppress or resist such disturbers of the peace
and quiet of the realm”).
62 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1156 (2008)
(observing that states “allow officers to defend themselves even in circumstances when others cannot,
because officers’ defensive force serves the state’s ends as well the officer’s”); Boykin v. People, 45 P.
419, 422 (Colo. 1896) (reasoning that a police officer effecting arrest “may stand his ground, and even,
in some circumstances, pursue his assailant until the latter has been disarmed or disabled from carrying
into effect his unlawful purpose; and this right of the defendant goes even to the extent, if necessary, of
taking human life”); United States v. Thomas, 11 M.J. 315, 317 (C.M.A. 1981) (“[I]t is a police officer’s
duty to protect the public as well as to subdue his adversary . . . .”).
63 See Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 305, 306 (2018) (“Whatever acts the law labels as force or violence, there should be little
doubt that police secure order through threats of superior physical force, and at least sometimes, actual
exercises of it.”); see also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (Mar. 18, 1799), in
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-22-02-0344
[https://perma.cc/FW7Y-KPMW] (“Whenever the Government appears in arms it ought to appear like a
Hercules, and inspire respect by the display of strength.”).
64
See John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly Force, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2014) (“Under the common law fleeing felon rule, both law enforcement
officers and private citizens enjoyed the privilege of using deadly force to secure the arrest of felons, but
neither could use the privilege to secure the arrest of misdemeanants.”); see also Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (“[T]he common-law rule . . . allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to
effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, though not a misdemeanant.”).
65 See Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1129 (1969)
(“An action by an official in excess of his authority was a trespass that could be resisted by physical
force.”); see also State v. Bethune, 99 S.E. 753, 754 (S.C. 1919) (affirming “[t]he right of a person to
resist an unlawful arrest, even to the extent of taking the life of the aggressor, if it be necessary, in order
to regain his liberty”); Queen v. Tooley (1709) 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 353 (Q.B.) (“[A] man ought to be
concerned for Magna Charta and the laws; and if any one against the law imprisons a man, he is an
offender against Magna Charta.”).
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liberty, and property of their nation’s inhabitants or its sovereignty.66 The
nation may only use such force as is necessary and proportional to an
imminent threat to life, liberty, property, or sovereignty of the nation. 67
Nations may arm themselves so as to present military capability superior to
that of other nations.68 Military power is subordinate to civil authority, and
both are subordinate to the Constitution.69 Responsibility for military power
is shared between states and the central government.70 Individuals, working
in concert, can use their collective power as military units to counterbalance
the depredation of a lawless national government when all ordinary political
processes fail or on behalf of government to quash lawless insurrections.71
Standing armies are not permitted.72
2. The Power Dynamics Among the Players
At this initial distribution of power and authority, the lines between
these different groups are indistinct, the roles played by individuals are
dynamic, and the boundaries between public and private, permitted and

66 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 649 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
Virginia military law, for example, ordered that ‘every one of the said officers, non-commissioned
officers, and privates, shall constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to
be produced whenever called for by his commanding officer.’” (quoting An Act to Amend and Reduce
into One Act, the Several Laws for Regulating and Disciplining the Militia, and Guarding Against
Invasions and Insurrections, 1785 Va. Acts ch. 1, § III)).
67 John J. Merriam, Natural Law and Self-Defense, 206 MIL. L. REV. 43, 59–60 (2010) (articulating
the customary international law Caroline Doctrine, which specifies that a nation can only exercise selfdefense where its need is “instant, overwhelming, leav[es] no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation,” and that the force used for self-defense must be proportional).
68 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, supra note 63.
69 See, e.g., IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the
defence of themselves and the state; and that the military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil
power.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVII (“[I]n time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be maintained, without the consent of the Legislature; and the military power shall
always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.”); Eugene Volokh,
State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 196–98 (2006) (quoting
these and other provisions).
70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2 (stating that state militias may be called into service by the
federal government).
71 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Power being
almost always the rival of power; the General Government will, at all times, stand ready to check the
usurpations of the State Governments; and these will have the same disposition towards the General
Government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.
If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress.”).
72 N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XVII (“[A]s standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty,
they ought not to be kept up . . . .”); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20 (“[S]tanding armies, in the time
of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be kept up . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, cl. XIII (“[A]s
standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up . . . .”).
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forbidden actions are porous.73 Private individuals who commit homicide in
self-defense require forgiveness of the sovereign, who eventually dispenses
it as a matter of course. 74 The exception is when one kills expressly or
implicitly in service of law enforcement, such as performing an execution or
punishing a felon, in which case the homicide is not merely excusable but
justified.75
Groups cannot arm themselves for public confrontation, even to protect
each other,76 unless they act at the direction of the local magistrate to effect
domestic law enforcement or security, or under a set of preexisting rules for
activating domestic law enforcement (like the hue and cry).77 If they do so
arm themselves as a law enforcement group, they may arm themselves to
present a superior force to those criminal suspects they encounter. However,
if they use excessive force as law enforcement agents, they lose the benefit
of acting in that capacity and are reduced to mere lawless individuals, and
may be resisted with appropriate force. Groups of individuals who are armed
publicly, in a fashion or place that is not familiar or customary, are liable for
breach of the peace, unlawful assembly, riot, or treason,78 unless they are
73 See NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING’S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307, at 92 (1969)
(noting that, as far back as the medieval period, “[t]he boundary between self-defence and felonious
slaying . . . raised problems”).
74 See Miller, supra note 60, at 89–90.
75 Id. at 91. The distinction is not always clear. See HURNARD, supra note 73, at 91 (“[A] distinction
was made between killing a felon who resisted arrest and killing in resisting attempted robbery. While
the former did not normally call for pardon the latter . . . was often thought to require it.”).
76 Compare 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 516 (John Curwood
ed., 8th ed. 1824) (1716) (“[A]n assembly of a man’s friends in his own house, for the defence of the
possession thereof . . . is indulged by law . . . .”), with Queen v. Soley (1707) 88 Eng. Rep. 935, 937
(Q.B.) (“Though a man may ride with arms, yet he cannot take two with him to defend himself, even
though his life is threatened . . . for he is in the protection of the law, which is sufficient for his defence.”).
77 HUTCHESON, supra note 55, at 381 (stating that it is not a crime for a person to “arm[] himself to
suppress dangerous rioters, rebels, or enemies, and endeavour[] to suppress or resist such disturbers of
the peace and quiet of the realm”). On the “hue and cry,” see Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of
Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 579 (1936) (noting that “until quite modern times
police duties were the duties of every man” and the “hue and cry . . . obliged all to cease work and join
immediately in pursuit of an offender”).
78 HUTCHESON, supra note 55, at 381 (“[E]ven where there has been no affray, or actual fighting and
assault, the public peace is . . . broken by such conduct as gives others serious cause of uneasiness and
alarm.”); An Act for the Punishment of Criminal Offenders (N.H. 1701), reprinted in 1 LAWS OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE 677, 679 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., 1904) (“[I]t is Enacted by the Authority aforesaid,
that every Justice of the Peace within this Province, may cause to be Stayd and Arreasted all Affrayers,
Rioters, Disturbers, or Breakers of the peace or any other that shall goe Armed Offensively . . . .”); Mark
Anthony Frassetto, To the Terror of the People: Public Disorder Crimes and the Original Public
Understanding of the Second Amendment, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 61, 71 (2018) (“Massachusetts directly tied
its restriction on carrying weapons in public with riot, affray, and breach of peace by calling for the arrest
of ‘all Affayers, Rioters, Disturbers or Breakers of the Peace, and such as shall ride or go armed
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acting at the direction of the local magistrate, on behalf of domestic law
enforcement, or as part of a military unit.
Organized military force, comprised of individuals, is a duty of the
community, and in America, governance is shared between different levels
of national and state government. Private individuals who take up arms as a
military unit at the direction of government can do so to suppress rebellions
and insurrections79 or to counter tyrannical government when all political
controls have failed. However, such group activity is not pursuant to any
ordinary concept of positive law as much as it is an appeal to “Nature and
Nature’s God.”80
In this state of initial equilibria, ordinary individuals would have a right
to possess weapons allowed by law in their homes, as well as incidental
rights to transport them to and from a place of manufacture or repair.81 They
would have to articulate a credible threat of imminent attack to take a weapon
out of their dwellings, unless the individuals provide assurances that
appearing armed would not be understood as a breach of the peace or that
carrying weapons accords with some other kind of accepted custom. If one
must use force for self-defense, the force must be necessary and proportional
to the threat. One cannot use a deadly weapon, for example, to defend oneself
from a battery committed by an unarmed child. If an individual can retreat
from the confrontation, he must, because society places superior value on
human life and public order than it does on any individual’s sense of
grievance. A person may not use a weapon that is capable of more force than
she is threatened with; otherwise, she becomes the threat, and the other party
is entitled to equalize the force.82 If an individual does kill an attacker, the
Offensively.’” (quoting An Act for the Punishing of Criminal Offenders, no. 6, 1694 Mass. Laws 12));
United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277, 1278 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,788) (recording the
prosecution’s instruction that “[b]y the English authorities, it is uniformly and clearly declared, that
raising a body of men to obtain, by intimidation or violence, the repeal of a law, or to oppose and prevent
by force and terror, the execution of a law, is an act of levying war” and that “whether it shall be treated
as riot, or treason, will depend on the quo animo”).
79 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 MICH.
L. REV. 1337, 1367 (2015) (“[T]he grant of authority to use the militias to suppress rebellions hinted that
Congress had acquired a general power to enact measures meant to subdue rebels.”).
80 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
81 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 725 (2007) (“Where
a law is so broad as to make gun ownership—or at least gun purchasing and repair—illegal, the courts
insure that the underlying right is more than illusory.”).
82 See Elizabeth Papp Kamali, The Devil’s Daughter of Hell Fire: Anger’s Role in Medieval English
Felony Cases, 35 LAW & HIST. REV. 155, 177 (2017) (“Typically the use of disproportionate force, such
as wielding a knife in response to a punch, would have been fatal to a self-defense plea.”); HURNARD,
supra note 73, at 93 (“In dealing with the point that the force used in self-defence must have been no
more than commensurate with the violence of the attack, a convenient rule of thumb was to judge it
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individual must demonstrate that it advances a public purpose and the action
must receive the actual or implicit approbation of the community.
If an individual is summoned to perform a law enforcement duty, she is
permitted to take a weapon with her out of her dwelling for that purpose.
And, similarly, she is allowed to threaten use of that weapon to effectuate an
arrest, to preserve property or life, or to maintain order. However, if she
threatens force in excess of her lawful authority, or if the arrest is wrongful,
the law enforcement agent becomes a criminal, and individuals may resist
that agent with force as if she was just another law-breaking individual.83
Finally, if an individual is summoned as part of the national defense, he
is allowed to equip himself with whatever weapons he possesses, and he can
be forced to equip himself with weapons of such quality to effectively help
others defend the nation or any portion of it. The power to summon this force
is shared between the federal and state governments, and persons exercising
this function are subject to the limitations and conditions of military
regulation. That individual may also join with other individuals in order to
resist tyrannical government, once all political safeguards have failed.
Clearly, there are multiple equilibria in this hypothetical scenario.
Individuals may only confront other individuals in public on an equal basis
and only as a last resort. Law enforcement may confront suspected
lawbreakers with superior force and anticipatorily. But if law enforcement
agents act outside of the law, individuals may treat those agents as simply
other threatening individuals and may respond with equal force. Nations may
confront foreign and domestic threats with superior force, and anticipatorily,
but only at the behest of national or state civil authorities. Because the
national defense is constituted by individuals, its function is limited by the
honor, willingness, and capacity of individuals to perform their duty. Finally,
an armed populace can resist the national defense in the extreme case in
which the nation uses the defense for tyrannical ends.84

excessive if an edged weapon had been used against an assailant who was unarmed or armed only with a
blunt instrument . . . . This rule was enforced with great strictness on occasion.”); Etter v. State,
205 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1947) (“It is [a] well recognized principle of law that when one is beset with a
single personal assault, not made by one of overpowering strength and force, the resistance thereto must
be proportionate to the nature of the assault.”).
83 See HURNARD, supra note 73, at 90 (discussing the case of Geoffrey le Skippere, who was
imprisoned “for having killed a thief who resisted arrest” on the supposition that Skippere had used
excessive force); see also cases and sources cited supra note 65.
84 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (“It was understood across the political
spectrum that the right [to keep and bear arms] helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might
be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.”).
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C. Equilibrium-Adjustment
Technological and social change can upset the balance among these
different categories of actors, requiring legal efforts to restore the initial
distribution of force and authority. This Essay focuses on three salient factors
that disrupt the Year-Zero equilibria: firearms and other weapons
technology, concealed weapons, and public carry.
1. Firearms and Other Weapons Technology
Firearms and other weapons technology upset the Year-Zero equilibria.
In the initial state, individuals can keep weapons to protect themselves in
their homes. Attackers armed with clubs, knives, and swords present a
comparatively smaller threat to an individual who is within her home than
out of her home; nor do such weapons possessed by an individual within her
home pose much of a threat to persons outside. The home serves as a kind of
perimeter for the rights to weapons, the use of self-defense, and the
externalities associated with both.
As the functional features of weapons—range, rate of fire, muzzle
velocity, and lethality—change, they upset these equilibria. Strategies like
barricading a door are less effective against someone armed with a firearm
than they are against someone armed with a club. Homeowners who repel
attackers with firearms in turn impose risks on others. The same rounds that
can penetrate walls and harm assailants can injure innocent neighbors,
pedestrians, or motorists when fired in self-defense. 85 In public
confrontation, it is much more difficult to safely retreat from parties armed
with firearms than from those armed with clubs or knives.86
Technology similarly disrupts the relationship between individuals and
law enforcement. The initial distribution of force and authority presumes that
private parties will perform law enforcement duties and will arm themselves
in such a fashion or in such numbers as to present superior force to those
they confront. An individual in the home with a firearm, however, can repel
many dozens of individuals who may not be similarly armed. Accordingly,
law enforcement activity like serving warrants, and certainly no-knock
warrants, become far more hazardous. This would mean that individuals
performing a law enforcement function must be able to equip themselves to
outgun any potential suspect or criminal. Moreover, to the extent the ex ante
85 See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 139 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The same military-style features pose
heightened risks to innocent civilians and law enforcement officers—certainly because of the capability
to penetrate building materials and soft body armor, but also because of an amalgam of other capabilities
that allow a shooter to cause mass devastation in a very short amount of time.”).
86 See State v. Gardner, 104 N.W. 971, 975 (Minn. 1905) (“The doctrine of ‘retreat to the wall’ had
its origin before the general introduction of guns . . . . Self-defense has not, by statute nor by judicial
opinion, been distorted, by an unreasonable requirement of the duty to retreat, into self-destruction.”).
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position requires private parties to conduct public law enforcement activities
with their own self-defense weapons, those weapons are likely to be more
powerful, further destabilizing the equilibria.
The disruption becomes starker once we move beyond firearm
technology to other law enforcement and military technologies. A home
booby-trapped to explode is undeniably safe from invasion, but it is also an
extreme hazard to the neighbors. Placing lethal weapons on personal drones
provides protection but plainly threatens others.87 If we extend the idea of
arms to military-grade weapons, biological or chemical agents, or
improvised explosive devices, individuals can potentially impair the
defensive capabilities of national governments.
Both protections of and restrictions on weapons technology aim to
restore the initial distribution of power. On the protection side, the fact that
firearms are allowed by law means that others must have access to them to
equalize the capacity for force.88 However, regulating their lethality, whether
by rate of fire, range, caliber, or other kinds of mechanisms, also attempts to
restore the ex ante balance, which prefers life over lethal confrontation—a
rule that, prior to firearms, would have been enforced by self-defense
doctrines like retreat.89
Such restrictions also help ensure that law enforcement has the capacity
to provide superior force in apprehending criminals. Restricting very
powerful weapons that would hold at bay numerous law enforcement actors
at once ensures that law enforcement has a superior capability than any one
individual. The same is true of prohibiting private ownership or manufacture
of military-grade weaponry.
Courts often consider whether a weapon is “dangerous and unusual”
when evaluating the degree to which the individual’s possession or use of
that weapon is protected by the Second Amendment. Yet, the metric to
examine whether an arm is an unprotected “dangerous and unusual” weapon
as opposed to a protected weapon in “common use” 90 cannot be the

87 See Ben Wolfgang, FAA Forum Gauges Approval of Drone Privacy, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/3/faa-forum-gauges-approval-of-drone-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/8NZR-CQE2] (“A Missouri man said that the drone debate has been backwards, and
that the focus should instead be on how quickly the federal government recognizes Americans’ freedom
to own and operate drones as methods of self-defense under the Second Amendment.”).
88 See State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (carrying weapons “‘in full open view’ . . .
places men upon an equality”).
89 See Ruben, supra note 57, at 83 (“Blackstone . . . explain[ed] a person's duty to retreat by reference
to ‘a real tenderness of shedding his brother’s blood.’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *185)).
90 Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 446 (5th Cir. 2016) (“If a weapon is dangerous and unusual, it is
not in common use and not protected by the Second Amendment.”).

257

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

commercial popularity of any particular weapons technology. That would be
intolerably circular.91 Nor can it be that a weapon is in common use when it
is used by the military and law enforcement because the military and law
enforcement are supposed to maintain a superior capacity for force. Instead,
guns are “dangerous and unusual” in private hands because they threaten to
upset the status quo ante distribution of power between individuals, law
enforcement, and the military. So, for instance, weapons that may be quite
commonly used by police departments, the National Guard, and the U.S.
military will still be “dangerous and unusual” to individuals because those
weapons potentially supply individuals with lethal force that matches or
exceeds that of either domestic law enforcement or the military. 92 At a
minimum, in order to maintain the equilibria, this may mean these law
enforcement and military-style weapons in private hands would be subject
to more thorough and intrusive regulation than other kinds of weapons.
2. Concealed Carry
Technology that makes weapons more concealable, as well as social
acceptance of carrying such weapons, also destabilizes the status quo ante
distribution of force and authority. In Year Zero, weapons could only be
carried openly. Practically, when individuals carry weapons openly, it is far
easier to establish whether they are doing so in accordance with the laws,
customs, and norms of the ex ante position. An individual’s outward
behavior with an openly carried weapon can help law enforcement assess
whether the person is responding to an imminent attack or is the aggressor.
Whether the weapon is being carried in a place and time according to custom
is far easier to ascertain when carried openly, as in, for example, carrying a
hunting rifle in the woods during deer-hunting season. It is also easier to
assess an individual’s purpose when he carries weapons openly, as when an
individual is engaging in law enforcement or is called up for active military
service.
Conversely, to conceal a weapon traditionally implied malicious or
lawless intent.93 In 1811, an attorney general in the Orleans Territory (which
91 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on how common
a weapon is at the time of litigation would be circular . . . .”).
92 See McCutchen v. United States, 145 Fed. Cl. 42, 52 (2019) (“[P]rohibitions [on dangerous and
unusual weapons] have included machineguns and others that are used primarily by the military in
warfare.”). This is why Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in Caetano v. Massachusetts, concerning
whether or not law enforcement or the military commonly use stun guns, seems misguided. See 136 S.
Ct. 1027, 1032 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he [Massachusetts] Supreme Judicial Court’s
assumption that stun guns are unsuited for militia or military use is untenable.”).
93 See, e.g., Bell v. State, 8 So. 133, 133 (Ala. 1890) (“The carrying concealed of a barbarous weapon
of this class, which is usually the instrument of an assassin, and an index of a murderous heart, is
absolutely prohibited by section 3776 of the Criminal Code of this state.”).
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would later become Louisiana) remarked on the legislature’s need to curb
“[t]he dangerous practice . . . which obtained in this country, and which still
too generally obtains, of wearing concealed weapons, ready to carry into
effect the irascible, malicious, and vindictive feelings of their owners.” 94
Later, another Louisiana court pointed to prohibitions on concealed weapons
“to counteract a vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying
concealed weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and assassinations committed
upon unsuspecting persons.”95
Concealed carry also makes it more difficult to enforce the laws and
customs that regulate where arms may be carried. Prohibitions on firearms
in “sensitive places” are a way of limiting the carrying of firearms only when,
where, and in such a manner as is customary.
The increased capacity and tolerance for concealed carry upsets this
status quo. Law responds by attempting to restore the initial balance. Blanket
prohibitions on weapons that are concealable, going back to the English
Renaissance and extending to the modern day, are one method of restoring
the status quo. For example, Henry VIII outlawed “little short hand-guns[]
and little hagbutts” of less than “one whole yard” and “three quarters of one
yard,” respectively, because of their use in crime and riot and because they
generated “peril and fear” in the populace. 96 The express purpose of this
regulation was to “ma[ke] it almost impossible to conceal the weapon.”97
Similar prohibitions on the carrying of concealed weapons—if not their
actual manufacture and possession—proliferated in the United States in an
attempt to restore the initial state.98
Alternatively, in lieu of blanket prohibitions on concealable weapons,
regulations also attempt to ensure the concealed weapons holder is
trustworthy—in other words, someone who will keep the peace and will not
cause harm to others. Restricting licensing to those who show good cause to
carry a concealed weapon reflects an attempt to restore the status quo ante
that arms should be carried only by those who need them upon reasonable
fear of imminent attack. 99 Similarly, licenses that require a gun owner to
94

Territory v. Mather, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 48, 49 (Orleans 1811).
State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489–90 (1850).
96 The Bill for Cross-Bows and Hand-Guns (1541), reprinted in 5 DANBY PICKERING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE, FROM THE THIRTY-SECOND YEAR OF KING HENRY VIII, TO THE SEVENTH YEAR
OF KING EDWARD VI, at 70, 71 (London, Cambridge Univ. Press 1763).
97 LOIS G. SCHWOERER, GUN CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 59 (2016).
98 See Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to
Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 584–86
(2006) (cataloging the rise of more concealed weapons and legislator and public-opinion opposition to
the practice).
99 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate she has training, or that require periodic license review and
renewal, or that require some indicia of virtue or judgment, are attempts to
restore the prior set of conditions that permitted arms bearing only among
those people unlikely to breach the peace or inflict unjustified violence.
3. Public Carry
The social practice of carrying weapons, concealed or unconcealed, also
disrupts the initial equilibria. In Year Zero, only those whose status showed
them to be peaceable, those in imminent danger, or those in law enforcement
or the military could carry arms publicly. “A gun is an ‘unusual weapon,’
wherewith to be armed and clad,” the North Carolina supreme court said in
1843.100 “No man amongst us carries it about with him, as one of his every
day accoutrements––as a part of his dress––and never we trust will the day
come when any deadly weapon will be worn or wielded in our peace loving
and law-abiding State, as an appendage of manly equipment.” 101 To the
extent public carry becomes commonplace, that disrupts the initial equilibria.
A custom of carrying firearms raises the risks associated with
confrontation between individuals. 102 Carrying firearms reduces the
effectiveness of nonlethal self-defense tools—like doors, locks, whistles, and
mace—and reduces the ability to safely retreat to avoid violence or loss of
life. The more firearms in public hands, the more reason private individuals
and law enforcement have to think that private confrontations or crime
prevention will result in gunfire.103 The practice of carrying arms publicly
also creates potential risks of a dangerous norm cascade.104 As Professor Saul
Cornell has written, according to Joseph Keble and his 1689 justice of the
peace manual, criminal prohibitions extend to instances when “a man shall
shew himself furnished with Armour or Weapon which is not usually worn”
because it will “strike a fear upon others that be not armed as he is.”105 The
reason why public arms are regulated is that, without them, there exists “an
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State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 422 (1843).
Id.
102 LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, GUNS IN PUBLIC PLACES: THE INCREASING THREAT OF
HIDDEN GUNS IN AMERICA (2011).
103 See id.
104 On norm cascades and risky behaviors like drugs and guns, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2033 (1996).
105 Saul Cornell, Limits on Armed Travel Under Anglo-American Law: Change and Continuity over
the Constitutional Longue Durée, 1688–1868, in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE OF
HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 74, 75 (Jennifer Tucker, Barton C.
Hacker & Margaret Vining eds., 2019) (quoting JOHN KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 147 (2d ed. 1689)).
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asymmetry of power between the individual armed and those unarmed, a
situation that undermine[s] the peace.”106
Laws that regulate carrying firearms reflect an attempt to restore the
previous equilibria between individuals, law enforcement, and the military.
As with permitting concealed carry, licensing helps arrest dangerous norm
cascades that permit anyone with a concern about safety to carry a weapon.
Individuals must demonstrate a particular need to have a deadly weapon to
protect themselves, different from the background risk that was present in
the ex ante situation, in order to discriminate between those facing an
imminent risk and those facing a risk indistinguishable from those of any
other individual.107 Requiring training to publicly carry firearms attempts to
reduce the costs imposed on third parties by errant firing, restoring the initial
position that obliged those who carry weapons to internalize the costs.
Criminal sanctions on carrying or parading with firearms without a license
do the same.108
II. RESETTING THE YEAR-ZERO EQUILIBRIA
One can imagine events that fundamentally reset the initial equilibria,
so that new equilibria must guide future regulation and rights. How this reset
occurs depends on how one imagines constitutional change to develop
outside the Article V amendment process.109
One theory of a fundamental reset would be through a process of
historical gloss or constitutional liquidation. 110 Gloss is the notion that
government practice of longstanding duration and express or tacit
acquiescence can give constitutional meaning to otherwise underdetermined
constitutional institutions or principles. 111 Constitutional liquidation is
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Id.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131 (2021) (requiring good cause to obtain a concealed carry
permit); Bell v. State, 8 So. 133, 133–34 (Ala. 1890) (noting defense to prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons that “at the time of carrying the weapon concealed, he had good reason to apprehend an attack,
which the jury may consider in mitigation of the punishment, or justification of the offense” (citing ALA.
CRIM. CODE § 3775 (1886))).
108 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (upholding prohibitions on private armed parades
against a Second Amendment challenge).
109 U.S. CONST. art. V.
110 I take no position at present on the differences between historical gloss and constitutional
liquidation or their implications for constitutional theory. For more on the topic, see generally Curtis A.
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate,
106 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2020).
111 Id. at 18 (stating that gloss requires “(1) governmental practice; (2) longstanding duration; and
(3) acquiescence”). Bradley and Siegel suggest that historical gloss is poorly suited to analyze individual
rights compared to separation of powers cases, although they recognize differences of opinion on that
score. Id. at 37–39.
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similar and comes from a remark from James Madison in The Federalist:
“All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on
the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less
obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by
a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” 112 Liquidation,
according to Professor William Baude, requires constitutional
indeterminacy, a course of practice over time, and a settlement reflected in
official acquiescence and public sanction.113 A similar way of thinking of a
reset is that it occurs slowly, as a continual layering of different Second
Amendment-adjacent doctrines governing public arms, self-defense, private
violence, and the like, that gradually obscure the Year-Zero equilibria and
eventually supplant them. This looks very much like Professor David
Strauss’s “common law constitution.” 114 A final theory is one of
“constitutional moments,” in the language of Professor Bruce Ackerman—
events that irrevocably alter the initial arrangements of power and
authority.115 In this model, the people act through exercise of “constitutional
politics” marked by an express appeal to common good, ratified by
mobilized American citizens, who then express “their assent through
extraordinary institutional forms.” 116 In these moments, our constitutional
order is amended, even though the formal requirements of Article V have not
been met.117
One need not subscribe to gloss, liquidation, common law
constitutionalism, or constitutional moments to accept that some
fundamental assumptions in the Year-Zero equilibria no longer prevail.
Indeed, the Heller majority obliquely recognizes two of them: the
ascendency of the standing army and the rise of the professional police
force.118 In some puzzling passages in Heller, Justice Scalia recognizes that
the security apparatus of 1791 and of the twenty-first century are
fundamentally different.119 Near the end of the opinion, Justice Scalia speaks,
seemingly with approval, of a “standing army [that] is the pride of our
112

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Baude, supra note 32, at 13–21.
114 See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010) (arguing that we have a
common law constitution in which precedent and incremental change are as or more significant than text).
115 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022
(1984).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1055–56 (describing the New Deal Era as a process of “constitutional creation” in which,
“[r]ather than acting under the explicit procedures established by Article V . . . We the People of the
United States expressed its will through a higher lawmaking process that relied primarily upon the
structural interaction of Articles I, II and III of the Constitution”).
118 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627–28, 636 (2008).
119 Id. at 636.
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Nation” and “well-trained police forces [that] provide personal security.”120
He acknowledges that
[i]t may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th
century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at
large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful
against modern-day bombers and tanks.121

And he further appears to endorse that, notwithstanding this lack of private
military capacity to counter a standing army, military weapons and their
analogues (“M-16 rifles and the like”) may be banned from private
armories. 122 And yet, Justice Scalia also curiously claims “modern
developments . . . cannot change our interpretation of the [Second
Amendment] right.”123
That sentiment may be true with respect to the notion that modern
developments cannot change interpretation of the right to keep a weapon at
home for self-protection. As with the Fourth Amendment, the home is the
fixed star for privacy as well as self-defense in Anglo-American law. 124
However, beyond that narrow understanding, it is almost impossible to
square these passages with other sections of Heller that disclaim any right to
possess, much less use, military-grade weapons, or other features of
constitutional law that question any constitutional right to resist law
enforcement with force of arms.125 If Justice Scalia really meant nothing had
changed with the right, it would empower individuals to possess shoulderfired missiles and biological weapons. It would mean that private citizens
would have rights to all the equipment that highly militarized police
departments use to apprehend criminals, protect property, quell riots, or fight
terrorists. It would mean that those perceiving wrongful arrests or excessive
force could threaten police with their publicly carried weapons.126 This isn’t
the society we live in. It must be that, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s
protestations, something has changed about the initial distribution of force
120

Id.
Id. at 627.
122 Id. at 627–28.
123 Id.
124 Kerr, supra note 21, at 517–18; Miller, supra note 47, at 1303.
125 United States v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We do not need citizen avengers
who are authorized to respond to unlawful police conduct by gunning down the offending officers . . . .
Thus we hold that the mere invalidity of a law officer’s conduct under the fourth amendment, without
more, can never justify the threat of deadly force in opposing the officer.”).
126 See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1230 (2017)
(“Until the latter half of the twentieth century, most American states and the Supreme Court recognized
and even celebrated a common law ‘right’ to resist unlawful arrest.”); see also cases and sources cited
supra note 65 (noting examples of a right to resist unlawful unrest).
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and authority from the initial equilibria, either through gradual acceptance
by political actors over time, or as a result of a convulsive national event and
subsequent ratification by the people at large.
Whatever the mechanism, we now live in a society in which a standing,
professional army, not citizen-soldiers, provide the national defense, as
Heller itself recognizes. 127 Similarly, our streets and communities for the
most part are policed by select, designated law enforcement professionals
accountable to political actors and constitutional restraints, not collections of
private individuals summoned in an emergency to enforce the laws of the
community. Both of these societal changes have permanently altered the
initial distribution of authority going forward.
A. The Standing Army
According to Professor Richard Kohn, “No principle of government
was more widely understood or more completely accepted by the generation
of Americans that established the United States than the danger of a standing
army in peacetime.”128 And yet within fifty years, and certainly after the first
century of American history, that deep and abiding distrust of standing
armies had given way to widespread acceptance of a permanent, professional
military in America.
The eclipse of the militia in favor of a standing army is a
multigenerational story of incompetence and corruption. Even at the
Founding, no less a figure than George Washington—while recognizing his
reliance on the citizen-soldier129—privately denigrated them.130 Conflict over
command, readiness, and performance during the War of 1812 further sullied
the reputation of the militia as an effective security force. 131 “Within two
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See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 2 (1975).
129 ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763–1789, at
596 (2005) (“Washington, dismayed as he often was by the militia, used such troops” rather than a special
“military caste” as in Europe.).
130 Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1776), in GEORGE
WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 75, 77–78 (W. B. Allen ed., 1988) (referring to the militia as “timid” and
“ready to fly from their own shadows”); see also MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 129, at 306 (describing
Washington’s sense of the weakness of a nonprofessional force of citizen-soldiers).
131 MICHAEL D. DOUBLER & JOHN W. LISTMAN JR., THE NATIONAL GUARD: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CITIZEN-SOLDIERS 20 (2003) (“The War of 1812 revealed glaring inadequacies
in the militia system and raised serious questions regarding the responsibilities the federal government
and the states shared for the common defense.”). The Supreme Court later remarked that more formal
drafting measures were required because militia support for the war was “weak” and rife with
“insubordination . . . among the forces” who did not want to cross borders. Arver v. United States,
245 U.S. 366, 384–85 (1918).
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decades of the ratification of the Constitution, American political leaders had
abandoned the original concept of the militia.”132
By the time of Reconstruction, militia units had all but ceased to be
useful organizations for national security; instead, they’d become either
targets for white-supremacist terrorism 133 or tools of white-supremacist
oppression.134 Carl Schurz in the immediate post-Civil War period pleaded
with Republicans in Congress not to allow Southerners to reform their
militias, knowing they’d be deployed to crush the freedmen’s new
liberties. 135 When Southern governments successfully reestablished their
militias, that’s exactly what they did.136
By 1933, when Congress passed its last major restructuring of the
militia, it “placed the final mark of inadequacy on the militia clause.” 137
Congress’s move in 1933 to create the National Guard of the United States
and separate it from the National Guard of the various states “proved
conclusively that a well-regulated militia is impossible of attainment under
the militia clause, and can be organized only by resort to the plenary and
untrammeled powers under the army clause.”138
The implication for equilibrium-adjustment is that using a militia as a
metric for private military power and authority is no longer viable. 139 It
makes no sense in 2021 to assume that private citizens have legal claims to
have the capacity to band together with sufficient personal force to actually
repel an invading army or to prevail against the U.S. military—at least apart
from some kind of splintering or mutiny of the organized militia. Whereas at
one time there may have been merit to the Framers’ notion that armed
citizens may be capable of spontaneously assembling to defend the nation,
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William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 42 (1992).
133 OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION 5 (1957).
134 GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF
RECONSTRUCTION 26–28 (2007).
135 CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH (1865), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES,
CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 279, 325–26 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913).
136 See RABLE, supra note 134, at 28; SINGLETARY, supra note 133, at 5; see also ERIC FONER,
NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY 106–08 (1983) (discussing how Southern
militias and law enforcement violently crushed Black labor organization in the late 1800s).
137 Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 208–
09 (1940).
138 Id.
139 Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 618 (2008) (“But a militia would be useless
unless the citizens were enabled to exercise themselves in the use of warlike weapons.” (quoting JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 239
(New York, Hurd & Houghton 1868))).

265

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

or to defeat a standing army,140 that is a vain concept as a matter of actual,
implementable law in the twenty-first century. It’s not just that the national
military has a superior power; it is that the military’s power utterly eclipses
civilian power. Legal arguments that attempt to determine how much
privately possessed firepower is required to effectively deter our own
military enlist the judiciary in an odd and unsavory exercise.141
B. Professional Law Enforcement
Like the standing army, the emergence of a politically accountable,
professionalized police force is also a permanent departure from the YearZero equilibria. The professional police force evolved in the middle of the
nineteenth century, replacing the previous constable-and-watch system, in
which private individuals with private weapons were called upon to keep the
peace and pursue criminals, either as a regular civic duty, or as an obligation
in an emergency. 142 This was an unsustainable system of public law
enforcement. 143 Volunteers were often unreliable. 144 More troubling, law
enforcement through private groups could be fickle, protecting the guilty and
punishing the innocent—especially as a method of policing norms of race,
gender, and class. As with the military, “the Civil War . . . completely
reordered the idea of a republican system of coercive enforcement.”145 Even
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of
the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 676 (1995) (“To suggest that civilians equipped with
Second Amendment-type weapons are any match for modern security forces invites murderous
confrontations that armed civilians will inevitably lose.”). For arguments that the Second Amendment
protects effective civilian military capacity, see Andrew P. Napolitano, The Right to Shoot Tyrants, Not
Deer, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/10/the-right-toshoot-tyrants-not-deer [https://perma.cc/WW48-S9WP] (“[The Second Amendment] protects the right to
shoot tyrants, and it protects the right to shoot at them effectively, with the same instruments they would
use upon us.”); John-Peter Lund, Note, Do Federal Firearms Laws Violate the Second Amendment by
Disarming the Militia?, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 469, 503 (2006) (doubting the constitutionality of
prohibitions on civilian ownership of “fully automatic firearms, as these are typical infantry weapons”);
Brief for the United States of America at 18, United States v. Zaleski, 686 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos.
11-660(L), 11-1888(CON)) (documenting effort by criminal defendant “to offer evidence at trial that he
was, by statute, a member of Connecticut’s unorganized militia, and therefore his possession of . . .
military-grade weapons” was protected). That it’s odd and unsavory has not kept one judge from
speculating. Miller v. Bonta, No. 19-CV-1537-BEN (JLB), 2021 WL 2284132, at *42–43 (S.D. Cal. June
4, 2021) (citing the military victories of Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, the Taliban, and Iraqi insurgents over
standing armies for the proposition that AR-15s are protected by the Second Amendment), appeal filed,
No. 21-55608 (9th Cir. June 10, 2021).
142 JONATHAN OBERT, THE SIX-SHOOTER STATE: THE DUAL FACE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 52 (2018).
143 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1197–99 (1999).
144 See id.
145 OBERT, supra note 142, at 40.
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as plutocrats began to hire private enforcement agencies, like the Pinkerton
Detective Agency, “a new kind of specifically public interest in protection”
emerged that presumed that “everyone, regardless of their particular racial
or economic classification,” was entitled to law enforcement protection.146
That kind of protection could only be provided by a stable, permanent, and
professional (or semiprofessional) class of public defenders, accountable to
the people and local constituencies rather than to any one person or family.
The professionalized police, and its power linked with democratic
representation, also coincided with expansions of its authority, leaving the
common law rules surrounding private violence and private law enforcement
unsuitable to a permanent domestic security institution. 147 Rather than the
common law of torts, courts now resort to constitutional and administrative
law to regulate policing.148 Today, a dizzying array of regulation and license,
from police-protective rights concerning searches, 149 to limits on police
officers’ use of deadly force, 150 to requirements for officer training, 151 to
police access to military surplus, 152 govern how law enforcement
professionals do their jobs.
As with the standing army, the implication is that the professional
police force is a permanent feature of our constitutional order and has
fundamentally reset the Year-Zero equilibria. It is not tenable to expect
private parties to possess and deploy the same amount of force as law
enforcement, nor is it expected that they possess the same authority to use
those weapons. Indeed, one of the risks of expanding positive rights to arms,
and a corresponding authority to use them, is that the ability of private parties
to use deadly force may potentially outstrip the authority of the professional
class specifically designated and trained to provide law enforcement. 153
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Id.
See Harmon, supra note 62, at 1149.
148 Id. (noting “the constitutionalization of excessive force regulation” for professional police).
149 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that police can do a protective pat-down to
ensure the individual is not carrying a weapon).
150 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (explaining that deadly force is not permitted to
stop a nonviolent fleeing felon).
151 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387–88 (1989) (suggesting that municipalities can be
liable for harms caused by equipping their officers with weapons but not training them on the
constitutional limits of their use).
152 See Michael Leo Owens, Tom Clark & Adam Glynn, Where Do Police Departments Get Their
Military-Style Gear? Here’s What We Don’t Know, WASH. POST (July 20, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/20/where-do-police-departments-get-their-militarystyle-gear-heres-what-we-dont-know/ [https://perma.cc/Y4LV-BHKR].
153 The Governor of Florida’s proposal to allow private parties, under the state’s “stand your ground”
law, to use deadly force to protect property in the vicinity of a mob is an example of private authorization
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Constitutional entitlements for private parties to possess law-enforcementgrade weapons, with little to no training, and authorized to deploy deadly
force beyond that of designated security professionals, appear inapt given
the fundamental institutional changes in law enforcement over the last two
centuries.
III. EQUILIBRIUM-ADJUSTMENT AND SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
There are currently two competing approaches to Second Amendment
doctrine in the wake of Heller. The first is championed by then-Judge, nowJustice Brett Kavanaugh and can be termed the “text, history, tradition, and
analogy-only” approach. In Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), Judge
Kavanaugh suggested that the only legitimate method for deciding Second
Amendment cases was by reference to “text, history, and tradition” and
analogical reasoning therefrom. 154 A prominent minority of judges have
endorsed his approach,155 as have several gun-rights advocates.156
The second approach, applied by the majority of circuits, 157 is more
conventional and is known as the “two-step” framework. In the first step, the
court examines whether a practice or regulation is covered by the Second
Amendment at all.158 Judges frequently use history or tradition as a metric at
the first step, but sometimes add other reference points. Some rely on Justice

to use lethal force. See Erik Ortiz, ‘Stand Your Ground’ in Florida Could Be Expanded Under DeSantis’
‘Anti-Mob’ Proposal, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/stand-your-ground-florida-could-be-expanded-under-desantis-anti-n1247555
[https://perma.cc/ZD3L-USUN].
154 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he proper interpretive
approach is to reason by analogy from history and tradition.”).
155 See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (Batchelder,
J., concurring in most of the judgment) (“By giving little more than a nod to the originalist inquiry, the
Greeno test radically marginalizes the role played by the text, history, and tradition of the Second
Amendment . . . .”); Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2018) (Elrod, J., dissenting from the
denial of hearing en banc) (endorsing a text, history, tradition, and analogy-only approach); United States
v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747, 761 (5th Cir. 2020) (Duncan, J., concurring) (“While our opinion today
dutifully applies our court’s two-step framework for post-Heller Second Amendment challenges, I write
separately to reiterate the view that we should retire this framework in favor of an approach focused on
the Second Amendment’s text and history.”).
156 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation, Heller
Foundation, Tennessee Firearms Ass’n, Conservative Legal Defense & Education Fund, & Restoring
Liberty Action Committee in Support of Petitioners at 16, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New
York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Ass’n of America,
Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 4, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (No. 18-280).
157 E.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Our court, along with the
majority of our sister circuits, has adopted a two-step inquiry in deciding Second Amendment
cases . . . .”).
158 Id. at 821.
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Scalia’s language in Heller as a benchmark. 159 Others resort to spatial
concepts like “cores” and “peripheries” of the right.160 If the court determines
the law is covered by the Second Amendment, the court then goes to the
second, tailoring step to examine whether it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest (strict scrutiny) or reasonably fitted to an
important government objective (intermediate scrutiny).161
Courts have struggled to apply these approaches, because the driver for
the analysis is frequently articulated at far too high a level of abstraction
(e.g., self-defense)162 or far too low (e.g., firearm prohibitions on eighteento-twenty-one-year-olds). 163 An equilibrium-adjustment theory of the
Second Amendment can provide judges with better guidance. Thinking
about how a modern rule relates to an initial set of equilibria can help explain
what makes a certain historical rule, practice, or tradition, or its analogy,
constitutionally relevant. For those that subscribe to the existing two-step
framework, this theory can offer similar guidance for the history, tradition,
and analogy inquiry at step one and help decide what kind of empirical data
is relevant at step two.
A. The Exclusive Text, History, Tradition, and Analogy Approach
An equilibrium-adjustment approach can help rationalize the text,
history, tradition, and analogy-only approach to Second Amendment
decision-making. As suggested by Chief Justice John Roberts,164 and echoed
by others, courts are to use text, history, tradition, and analogy to examine
both rights and regulations. There are “lineal descendants” of arms in use in

See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 131 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Heller Court specified that
‘weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned’ without
infringement upon the Second Amendment right.” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
627 (2008))).
160 See Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821. For more on “core” and “periphery” analysis of the Second
Amendment, see William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—and Enforcing the Fourteenth,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801, 1841 (2017).
161 Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821–22.
162 See Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 151–52, 154–55 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (stating that a prohibition on highcapacity magazines, primarily used for self-defense, “eviscerate[s]” the right to keep and bear arms). For
more on the “denominator” problem of determining what portion of activity must be restricted to amount
to a destruction of the Second Amendment right, see generally Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308,
343–51 (2019).
163 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334,
339 (5th Cir. 2013) (Jones, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting no Founding Era
regulation “specifically limits firearms possession or purchase by minors or 18 to 20 year old people”).
164 Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07290).
159
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the eighteenth century that are protected today, 165 and there are “lineal
descendants” of traditional regulations.166
But, as scholars have noted, working from analogy to text, history, and
tradition without some object, some defined “rule of relevance,”167 ends up
making constitutional decision-making not only obscure, but obscurantist.168
It leads to arcane arguments that because a multiround weapon—the “Puckle
Gun”—was patented in 1718 in England, extended magazines must be
covered by the Second Amendment today. 169 Such an argument totally
ignores significant differences between the technological viability,
commercial availability, and lethality of such weapons then, compared to
now,170 and, more importantly, the effects of such weapons on the relative
distribution of power and authority between individuals, law enforcement,
and the military.
More problematic is the way some judges use analogy to favor only one
side of the argument. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was guilty
of this when it found that stun guns were not sufficiently similar to
eighteenth-century weapons to be covered by the Second Amendment.171 In
reversing, the Supreme Court reiterated that “the Second Amendment
165 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The modern handgun—and
for that matter the rifle and long-barreled shotgun—is undoubtedly quite improved over its colonial-era
predecessor, but it is, after all, a lineal descendant of that founding-era weapon . . . .”), aff’d sub nom.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
166 Transcript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) (“Chief Justice Roberts:
[Y]ou would define ‘reasonable’ in light of the restrictions that existed at the time the amendment was
adopted . . . . [Y]ou can’t take it into the marketplace was one restriction. So that would be—we are
talking about lineal descendants of the arms but presumably there are lineal descendants of the restrictions
as well.”); see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 465 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (stating that
modern gun-possession prohibitors “are ‘lineal descendants’ of historical laws banning dangerous people
from possessing guns”).
167 For discussion of the rule of relevance in analogical reasoning, see Frederick Schauer, Analogy
in the Supreme Court: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 421–23 (2014).
168 See Blocher, supra note 162, at 363 (“Guns have no progeny, so one cannot trace their lineage
directly through some kind of family tree. Instead, one must employ analogies, which depend on the
identification of relevant similarities.”).
169 Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 2020).
170 For the Puckle Gun’s limitations, see David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & Scott G. Hattrup, A
Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177, 1195
(1995) (“The Puckle gun was ridiculed at the time as an impractical design, and called a scheme for
separating investors from their money. But it demonstrates that the concept of machine guns existed, even
if the metal working technology of the day was not capable of making the weapon.”); see also C. F.F.,
Puckle’s Gun, 15 J. SOC’Y FOR ARMY HIST. RSCH. 46, 46–48 (1936) (describing that the Puckle Gun
likely required two persons to operate, almost certainly could not fire very rapidly if at all, and may have
sustained significant barrel damage after use).
171 Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 693 (Mass. 2015) (reasoning that because “a stun gun
was not in common use at the time of enactment,” it wasn’t covered by the Second Amendment), cert.
granted, vacated sub nom. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam).
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extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even
those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”172
Other jurists have erred in the opposite direction. These jurists look to
analogues at a high level of generality when they decide whether an activity
or technology is covered but then become extremely particular when they
examine the provenance of regulations. So, for example, today’s largecapacity magazines are protected by the Second Amendment because they
look like eighteenth-century Puckle Guns, but today’s good-cause licensing
requirements are unconstitutional because they don’t look like eighteenthcentury surety laws.173 Examples of this asymmetry abound: guns in tents are
like guns in homes and are therefore protected by the Second Amendment;174
safe storage for guns and ammunition are unlike safe storage for gunpowder
and, hence, are unconstitutional.175
Equilibrium-adjustment may help rationalize this process. First, it can
help judges to recognize that analogy has to take place on both the rights and
the regulation side of the equation. Second, it provides a goal—the
restoration of a status quo ante distribution of power and authority—that this
exercise in analogical reasoning is supposed to produce.
B. The Two-Step Framework
The two-step framework also relies on history at step one, and so
equilibrium-adjustment can help guide the analogical work at the first step
the same as in the text, history, tradition, and analogy-only approach.176 But,
as is often the case, when the history is conflicted or indeterminate, or the
analogy is strained, courts will suffer what Professor Kathleen Sullivan calls

172 Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–82
(2008)).
173 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e conclude that . . .
carrying beyond the home, even in populated areas, even without special need, falls within the
Amendment’s coverage, indeed within its core.”).
174 Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014) (“[A] typical
home at the time the Second Amendment was passed was cramped and drafty with a dirt floor—more
akin to a large tent than a modern home. Americans in 1791—the year the Second Amendment was
ratified—were probably more apt to see a tent as a home than we are today.”).
175 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 631 (dismissing “[a] 1783 Massachusetts law [that] forbade the residents
of Boston to ‘take into’ or ‘receive into’ ‘any Dwelling-House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house,
Store, Shop or other Building’ loaded firearms and permitted the seizure of any loaded firearms that ‘shall
be found’ there” (quoting Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. XIII, 1783 Mass. Acts p. 218)).
176 See supra Section III.A.
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an “analogical crisis,”177 and judges must then turn to some kind of means–
end scrutiny.
It is here that equilibrium-adjustment can help guide the analysis of
what kind of data is relevant for purposes of tailoring. For example, if the ex
ante position is that individuals who carry firearms must internalize costs
they impose upon others⎯either through licensing, civil liability, criminal
sanction, or ex ante insurance mechanisms⎯then equilibrium-adjustment
theory can assess whether and to what extent any given regulation actually
works to force individuals to internalize those costs. Similarly, to the extent
that private possession of firearms in the home is meant to equalize the
capacity and authority for use of force, equilibrium-adjustment can help
decide empirically what kind of weapons, with how many rounds, and
capable of what kind of stopping power, are necessary to adequately defend
the occupants from ordinary criminal threats.
CONCLUSION
The next decade of Second Amendment doctrine will be pivotal to its
success or failure. A constitutional doctrine must, at a minimum, make a
constitutional right effective as supreme law, be capable of answering
questions posed by social and technological change, be administrable by
officers operating under various resource constraints, be intelligible to the
populace it governs, and manage risk.178
Typically, constitutional doctrine has decades to work through these
various criteria. Perhaps because the stakes are so high, 179 Second
Amendment case law at the Supreme Court level has been stymied. The
177 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
61 n.248 (1992); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992) (similar). One can imagine all kinds of analogical crises
with the history-and-tradition approach: Federal law forbids handguns in the carry-on luggage of
commercial airline passengers. Is the cabin of a commercial airliner more like a horse-drawn carriage?
Or a boat? See An Ordinance to Prevent Accidents from the Firing of Cannon or Other Guns on Boats, in
Front of the City of Cincinnati § 1 (1828) (“[I]t shall not be lawful for any person or persons having
charge or being on board of any boat upon the Ohio river, when passing by, stopping at, or leaving the
city of Cincinnati, to cause any cannon, gun or other fire-arms, to be so fired as to discharge its contents
towards the city . . . .”).
178 See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 32–33 (2014) (discussing the
application of risk management to constitutional law). Some of these criteria are inspired by Professor
Lon Fuller’s account of the internal morality of the law. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
34–38 (rev. ed. 1969) (using the fictitious example of “Rex” to demonstrate eight ways to fail to make
law).
179 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)
(“This is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic
act of mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment
rights.”).
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Court has not decided the substance of a Second Amendment case in ten
years, but that’s certain to change given the recent certiorari grant in New
York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.180 Equilibrium-adjustment
theory is one way the Justices may be able to set the doctrine on the right
track.

180 No. 20-843 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/
docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-843.html [https://perma.cc/V2JA-ME2E] (granting the petition for a
writ of certiorari limited to the question “[w]hether the State’s denial of petitioners’ applications for
concealed-carry licenses for self-defense violated the Second Amendment”); see also Devan Cole &
Jessica Schneider, Barrett’s Confirmation Could Lead to the Supreme Court Taking Rare Action on Gun
Rights, CNN (Oct. 10, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/10/politics/barrett-secondamendment-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/X7AR-ASRZ].
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